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THE SPEEDY TRIAL GUARANTEE: CRITERIA AND
CONFUSION IN INTERPRETING ITS VIOLATION
INTRODUCTION
The criminal law procedural guarantee of a speedy trial is found in
five sources today: (1) The sixth amendment of the United States Con-
stitution,1 (2) state statutes implementing this constitutional right, 2 (3)
rules of courts,3 (4) by the common law, 4 and (5) to a lesser extent by
the due process clause of the fifth amendment of the United States Con-
stitution.5 This guarantee of a speedy trial is considered to have four
objectives: "(1) To prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior
to trial, (2) to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public ac-
cusation . . . (3) to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the
ability of an accused to defend himself . . ." and (4) to protect the
interests of society in the orderly and effective administration of justice.7
Although the right to a speedy trial is "one of the most basic rights
preserved by our Constitution,"'8 a guarantee "as fundamental as any of
the rights secured by the Sixth Amendment,"9 the Supreme Court has
given very few decisions interpreting and enforcing this right.1 0 Conse-
1. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial...." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. See notes 73 and 156 infra.
3. FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b); 2d Cut. R. (1971), reported in 8A J. MOORE, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE 48.03 [1] n.1 (2d ed. Supp. 1971). The power to enact these
federal court rules is given in 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1970).
4. A court has the inherent power, in the absence of a statute, to dismiss a
case for lack of prosecution. See United States v. Alagia, 17 F.R.D. 15 (D. Del.
1955); cf. Ex Parte Altman, 34 F. Supp. 106, 108 (S.D. Cal. 1940).
5. See notes 81-83 and 134-35 and accompanying texts infra.
6. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).
7. See Mr. Justice Powell's majority opinion in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514
(1972).
8. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226 (1967).
9. Id. at 223.
10. Previous to Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), there were only seven
Supreme Court opinions rendered dealing with the right to a speedy trial. See
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971); Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30
(1970); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386
U.S. 213 (1967); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966); Pollard v. United
States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957); Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77 (1905).
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quently, its scope for all but the last few years has been almost entirely
defined by lower federal" and state courts.' 2
HISTORY AND EFFECT
The right to a speedy trial was first noted in the common law of Eng-
land by the Magna Carta: "to no one will we sell, to no one will we deny
or delay right or justice.' 3 This right was implemented in England by
special writs designed to protect citizens from perpetual imprisonment
where bail was not allowed.' 4 One such writ was the Habeus Corpus Act
of 1679,15 which is seen historically as the antecedent of our sixth amend-
ment right.' 6  Eventually the maxim "[j]ustice delayed is justice de-
nied"' 7 became ingrained in the English criminal law and was carried
over to its colony-America.' 8
When the Bill of Rights was being drawn for the Constitution some
of its writers thought that the right of speedy trial was so clearly a part of
our "liberty" under the common law that no amendment to the Constitu-
tion was needed to preserve it.'0 However, the people wanted this right
secured, and listed the right to a speedy trial first in the procedural rights
guaranteed in the sixth amendment.20  It is significant that the due proc-
ess clause of the fifth amendment guarantees a fair trial. Thus the reit-
eration of the need for speed in the sixth amendment may be viewed as
11. For an analysis of federal court decisions, see Note, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 414
(1960).
12. Note, The Right To A Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 846
(1957).
13. MAGNA CARTA (1215); see 2 E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
45 (1642).
14. 2 E. COKE, supra note 13, at 42.
15. 31 Charles II, ch. 2 (1679). This act required bail upon request for all but
those indicted for treason or a felony, however, people in these two categories
would be released on bail if they were not indicted at the next term of court unless
the King's witnesses could not be produced. The act also provided for complete
discharge for those not indicted and tried by the second term. See also L. KUTNER,
WORLD HABEAS CORPUS 84-85 (1962).
16. United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 196-97 (D. Md.), aff'd mem.,
350 U.S. 857 (1955).
17. This maxim appears to be derived from its Latin form and translated first
in 2 E. COKE, supra note 13, at 55.
18. The Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, § 8, provided "a man hath a
right . . . to a speedy trial. .. ."
19. See United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 196 (D. Md.), afj'd mem.,
350 U.S. 857 (1955).
20. See United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 196 (D. Md.), aff'd mem.,
350 U.S. 857 (1955). See also HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT (1951).
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a means of emphasizing this right.21
However, this right has been separated from the other criminal pro-
cedural rights of the Bill of Rights and enforced differently because it
has been viewed as not only a right guaranteed a citizen but also one for
the protection of society. 22 As such its determination has been left to an
examination of each case rather than the setting of a fixed time limit.
This has led to much uncertainty as to how this right should be applied, 23
and the view that "the essential ingredient is orderly expedition and not
mere speed."'24
Delay in bringing a defendant to trial may affect his ability to defend
himself in that: (1) witnesses may die, leave the jurisdiction or become
impeachable during the delay; (2) memories will fade;2 5 and (3) there is
an enhanced possibility of loss or damage to documentary and other evi-
dence. These factors will also affect the prosecution and coupled with
the time delay itself may erode the motivation of the prosecution to try
the case. Thus the effective disposition of the case often succumbs to a
guilty plea for a lesser offense. Furthermore, this is only one of the costs
to society that occur where the right to speedy trial is not enforced.
21. It should also be noted that the fourth and fifth amendments protect all
citizens from "unfair" criminal prosecution, while the sixth and eighth amendments
are intended to protect those who stand "accused" of a criminal act. These added
rights are to protect one upon whom the prosecutorial forces of the state has turned
and whose liberty has been or is in the greatest jeopardy of loss.
22. "In addition to the general concern that all accused persons be treated
according to decent and fair procedures, there is a societal interest in providing a
speedy trial which exists separate from and at times in opposition to, the interests
of the accused." Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972). However, the Bill of
Rights was intended to secure rights to protect the citizen from the federal govern-
ment, not citizens from other citizens. The reading of societal interests into a
speedy trial right may be intellectually proper as to weighing an individual's rights
as against that of society as a whole. Nevertheless, it has no place when one is
speaking of secured fundamental rights of an accused as granted by the Constitu-
tion. The cost to society should be a catalyst to implement speedy trials, not an
excuse for deterring them.
23. "A requirement of unreasonable speed would have a deleterious effect both
upon the rights of the accused and upon the ability of society to protect itself."
United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966). See Note, The Right To A
Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1957), for a discussion of the
speedy trial right.
24. Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 10 (1959).
25. The underlying idea of the trial process is to reconstruct past events from
present memories. The law of evidence was developed to get accuracy from an
essentially unreliable faculty-the memory. It is well noted that "[tihe more re-
cent the experience, the better the memory of it." Gardner, The Perception and
Memory of Witnesses, 18 CORNELL L.Q. 391, 392-93 (1933). Therefore, the
longer the delay the more unreliable the witness becomes and so too any convic-
tion based on such testimony.
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When a defendant is released on bail and his trial is delayed there is
always the possibility that during the longer delay he may choose not to
appear at trial and forego his bail. Thus, a criminal may be at large
to commit crimes again.26 The delay also causes the postponement of any
rehabilitative process and may be detrimental to rehabilitation itself.
Where a defendant must remain in jail he may lose his wages resulting in
society being liable for the care of any family that relies on him. It costs
the state money to keep him in jail,27 and his presence often causes over-
crowding, which in turn may cause rioting.28 Moreover, a speedy trial
would eliminate the need for "preventive detention" 29 and would comple-
ment bail reform. It also would enhance the deterrent power of punish-
ment, for society seeks deterrence from the day the crime is known. If
the system reacts with unreasonable delays, then deterioriation if not de-
struction of respect for and faith in the law occurs.
However, at present many arrested defendants are not accorded a
26. Also during extended delay the defendant may be able to intimidate wit-
nesses. See generally ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE, SPEEDY TRIAL 10-11 (Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter referred to as ABA
STANDARDS].
27. It has been estimated that it costs the state three to nine dollars a day to house,
feed and guard a jailed person. See THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY,
A REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN-
ISTRATION OF JUSTICE 131 (1967).
28. Much of the blame for the New York City jail riots in 1970 was placed on
the fact that 40 percent of the inmates had been waiting over a year for trial.
See N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1971, at 69, col. 1. A study in 1971 showed that 52
percent of those in city jails were being held for reasons other than criminal con-
victions. See Wilson, Delay and Congestion In the Criminal Courts, 46 FLA. B.J.
88 (1972).
29. A study by the National Bureau of Standards of the Department of Com-
merce indicated that during the first 60 days of release, the likelihood of rearrest
was very low, but after five to eight months of release pending trial the statistical like-
lihood of a defendant committing another crime was quite high. This study was re-
ported in Hearings on Preventive Detention Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1970).
Therefore, if a speedy trial was given to an accused the underlying reasons for
preventive detention-the elimination of crimes committed by those released on
bail-would be substantially erased.
Furthermore, the preventive detention system in Washington, D.C. has been
utilized infrequently (only seven persons were detained between February and July of
1971) because of the lack of availability of a speedy trial. Although the 1970
act allows the district to hold an accused up to 60 days prior to trial and requires
the case to be listed on an expedited calender, the courts find it "virtually impos-
sible to bring a defendant to trial within 60 days." Therefore, those not brought to
trial within 60 days are treated like any other defendant and subject to release
making the act futile in its ultimate attempt to protect society for an extended period
of time. See KATZ, ANALYSIS OF PRETRIAL DELAY IN FELONY CAsEs-A SUMMARY
REPORT 9 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as KATZ].
speedy trial in the state30 or federal courts.8 ' When these defendants
are not released on bail they must remain incarcerated for lengthy pe-
riods of time often because of inadequacies in the criminal justice system,
and have a higher possibility of receiving a prison sentence than those
released on bail.8 2 However, this extended incarceration is clearly in-
compatible with the presumption of innocence in our criminal law. 8
These delays have many sources, but the most frequently mentioned
are increased caseload, lack of resources, pre-trial procedural devices, 4
scheduling difficulties, delay caused by the defense and prosecution, and
financing. 85 The financing and lack of resources causes of delay could
be erased by giving the courts the manpower and the "tools" to try crim-
inal cases within 60 days after indictment.80 If the state legislatures and
Congress are unwilling to do so it may be possible for courts to order the
payment of such sums under the theory that the legislature may not hinder
the workings of a co-equal branch of government which "must possess
the inherent power to determine and compel payment of those sums of
money which are reasonable and necessary to carry out its mandated
30. In Cleveland, Ohio, less than one-third of all cases involving jailed defend-
ants, and only 10 percent of those bailed, were disposed of within a recommended
period of three months, the average time span being 245 days. See KATZ, supra note
29, at 2. This study also showed how overworked prosecutors and judges may let a
guilty person plea bargain because of post indictment delay, while an innocent
defendant in jail may plead guilty in order to be released. Id. at 6.
31. As of June 30, 1970, more than 6000 federal district court criminal cases
(30 percent of all pending cases) had been awaiting trial for one year or more. (It
should be noted that about one-half of these backlogged cases involved defendants
who were termed "fugitive.") JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL
REPORT 1970, at 155-57 (1971).
32. Statistics from Cleveland, Ohio, indicated that a jailed defendant was twice
as likely as a bailed defendant to be sentenced to the penitentiary or reformatory.
KATZ, supra note 29, at 8.
33. See Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 50 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
34. Judge William J. Campbell of the Northern District of Illinois believes that
the extended delay today has been caused by the United States Supreme Court, in
that the Court has made eight trials out of one (four before trial, one the trial
itself, another during, and two after trial) because of its changes in procedural law.
See Address by the Hon. William 3. Campbell, Conference of Metropolitan Chief
District Judges of the Federal Judicial Center, printed in full in 55 F.R.D. 229,
231-34 (1972).
35. Comment, Speedy Trials and the Second Circuit Rules Regarding Prompt
Disposition of Criminal Cases, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1060-62 (1971). See also
Frizer v. McMann, 437 F.2d 1312, 1314-15 (2d Cir. 1971), where 18 causes of de-
lay are listed, five of which deal with "manpower" shortages.
36. Address by Chief Justice Burger to the American Bar Association, Aug.
10, 1970.
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responsibilities, and its powers and duties to administer Justice .... "837
The sixth amendment right to a speedy trial has been determined by the
Supreme Court to be applicable to state proceedings by the fourteenth
amendment,38 and this decision has been interpreted as having retroactive
effect.39 The remedy for the violation of this right is the dismissal of the
charge with prejudice, and reindictment will not be allowed. 40 This rem-
edy has apparently never been questioned in the federal courts, 41 al-
though some states have not agreed with it in relation to state imple-
mentary statutes.42
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING THE SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHT
There are two major issues to be discussed in interpreting the sixth
amendment guarantee of a speedy trial. First, one must determine the
criteria by which to judge the constitutionality of delays in regard to
whether they violate the right. Second, at what point in time during the
criminal process does the right attach.
THE CRITERIA OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
In determining whether a defendant has been deprived of his right to
a speedy trial there are four factors which a court will assess: (1) Length
of delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his
right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. 43  A court is to balance these
37. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 52, 274 A.2d 193, 197, cert. denied, 402
U.S. 974 (1971). In this case the Pennsylvania trial court instituted a mandamus
proceeding to compel the mayor and city council of Philadelphia to appropriate
additional funds for the administration of the court. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court ruled that the mandamus proceeding was permissible. Therefore, there is a
possibility that courts unable to fulfill their constitutional duty to provide a speedy
trial because of monetary shortages may be able to mandamus the appropriation
of such sums.
38. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
39. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970), held by implication that Klopfer
and Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969), were to be retroactive in their application.
40. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30
(1970); See also ABA STANDARDS, supra note 26, at § 4.1; The Speedy Trial Act of
1971, S. 895, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 316(2) (1971) [hereinafter referred to as the
Speedy Trial Act of 1971].
41. Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 VA. L. REV. 1587, 1611 (1965)
[hereinafter referred to as Note, Lagging Right].
42. Id. at 1611 n.128. See generally Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 943 (1956).
43. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). See Dickey v. Florida, 398
U.S. 30, 48 n.12 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). See also People v. Canaday,
49 Ill. 2d 416, 275 N.E.2d 356 (1971), for an example of the use of these factors in
Illinois.
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factors in order to determine whether the constitutional right has been
abridged.44
1. Length of the Delay
"The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent
with delays and depends upon circumstances. '45  These two sentences
have been seen as approval of inaction by the judiciary for over sixty
years46 and as such have hindered the development of the speedy trial
right. Generally, no violation of this right will be proven solely
by reference to periods of time;47 nor will a delay be held reasonable
merely because it is of short duration. 48  Rather the length of delay is
"to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which
is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the
other factors that go into the balance."149
There have been many proposals to set a time limit between arrest (or
indictment) and trial beyond which the speedy trial right would be
deemed violated and the charges would be dismissed. Two such pro-
posed time limits for those in jail have been set at 60 days by the Ameri-
can Bar Association5" and the proposed Speedy Trial Act of 1971,51 and 4
months by a presidential commission. 52 A longer period is suggested for
44. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
45. Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905).
46. United States v. Dunn, 459 F.2d 1115, 1122-25 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Bandy, 269 F. Supp. 969, 970 (D.N.D. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 912 (1968).
48. See Powell v. United States, 352 F.2d 705, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1965) and Jack-
son v. United States, 351 F.2d 821, 822 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Both these cases in-
volved five month delays and were measured by due process standards. In Barker
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972) the Supreme Court stated that: "the delay
that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a
serious, complex conspiracy charge." Thus the Court was making further distinc-
tion in relation to the brevity of delay, in that the delay must be measured by the
type of crime involved.
49. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
50. ABA Standards, supra note 26.
51. Speedy Trial Act of 1971, supra note 40 at § 3161(b)(1). The intent of
this proposed bill was shown by its stated purpose: "To give effect to the sixth
amendment right to a speedy trial for persons charged with offenses against the
United States and to reduce the danger of recidivism by strengthening the super-
vision over persons released on bail, probation, or parole, and for other purposes."
See also KATZ, supra note 29, where he recommends a 60 day period from arrest for
those detained in jail and 120 days for defendants released on bail.
52. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 155 (1967). This
commission recommended the period between trial and appeal be set at five months so
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those released on bail in the congressional and A. B. A. proposals. All
of these proposals have factual occurrences which are considered neces-
sary delay, which would be excluded in computing the time period for
trial.53
The Second Circuit adopted a set of rules of court in 1971 as to speedy
trial limits54 which are similar to the A. B. A. standards and in some
respects simply reiterated them in a mandatory form.55 Similarly, the
Florida Supreme Court has, as a rule of court, established time limits
within which a speedy trial must be given-180 days for felonies, 90 days
for misdemeanors, and upon formal request the state will be given 60
days to bring a defendant to trial.56
However, the Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo 57 stated that it was
"impossible to determine with precision when the right has been denied.
We cannot definitely say how long is too long. . . ."58 Consequently
that no more than nine months elapse from arrest or indictment to freedom or in-
carceration.
53. The ABA recommends five periods to be excluded: (1) where a compe-
tency hearing, hearings on pre-trial motions, interlocutory appeals, and trial of other
charges; (2) delay caused by the congestion of the trial docket "when the congestion
is attributable to exceptional circumstances;" (3) where a continuance is granted at
the request of or with the consent of the defendant or his counsel; (4) where the
prosecutor requests delay because of: (a) the unavailability of material evidence
where there is due diligence and there are reasonable grounds to believe that such
evidence will be available at the later date; or (b) additional time is justified be-
cause of exceptional circumstances in the case; and (5) the absence or unavail-
ability of the defendant. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 26, at § 2.3. The periods
in the Proposed Speedy Trial Act of 1971 are similar to these, except that the
second exception--congestion of the trial docket-is excluded. Proposed Speedy
Trial Act of 1971, supra note 40, at § 3161. An amendment to the bill by Senator
Thurmond would have added this second period and allowed delay to last up to
120 days. Id.
54. The Second Circuit Rules are set forth in 8A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
48.03 [1], n.1 (2d ed. Supp. 1971). For a discussion of these rules see Comment,
Speedy Trials and the Second Circuit Rules Regarding Prompt Disposition of
Criminal Cases, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1065-76 (1971). The Supreme Court in
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 n.29 (1972), expressly noted that its decision
against a fixed time cut-off date was not to be interpreted as disapproving a presump-
tive rule adopted pursuant to a supervisory court's power.
55. See Godbold, Speedy Trial-Major Surgery For a National Ill, 24 ALA.
L. REV. 265, 291-92 (1972).
56. 98 TIME, Nov. 8, 1971, at 80. The immediate effect of this rule, as would
be the effect of any time limit rule, was the release of over one hundred defendants
in Dade County alone between March and November, 1971 and has caused what
is termed a "sea of confusion" in backlogged cases. Id.
57. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
58. Id. at 521.
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the Court rejected the view that it should set a rule for a specific length
of time as proposed by the A. B. A. stating that it "goes further than the
Constitution requires . . .,"59 and left such rulemaking activity to the leg-
islature.60 However, some courts view a certain time period as a
"lengthy" delay, creating a presumption of prejudice which may shift the
burden of proof to the government 6 or may even be dispositive of the
issue. 62  The District of Columbia has adopted a rule that any delay
which exceeds one year between arrest and trial raises a speedy trial
claim of prima facie merit,63 but most circuits view the mere passage
of time as not constituting a per se violation of the sixth amendment. 64
Generally time is not the most important factor in determining whether
a speedy trial has been denied. 65 When speaking of the presumption of
a violation due to the length of delay the courts are speaking of a pre-
sumption of prejudice, for delay alone without prejudice to a defendant's
ability to defend, is insufficient to constitute the constitutional violation.66
59. Id. at 529.
60. The Court noted that: "such a result would require this Court to engage in
legislative or rulemaking activity, rather than in the adjudicative process to which
we should confine our efforts. We do not establish procedural rules for the States,
except when mandated by the Constitution. We find no constitutional basis for
holding that the speedy trial right can be quantified into a specified number of
days or months. The States, of course, are free to prescribe a reasonable period
consistent with constitutional standards, but our approach must be less precise."
Id. at 523. For a recent study of the speedy trial schemes of states, see Note,
Speedy Trial Schemes and Criminal Justice Delay, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 794,
803-12 (1972).
61. See Hedgepeth v. United States, 364 F.2d 684, 687 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The
burden is then on the government to show an absence of prejudice.
62. See United States v. Chase, 135 F. Supp. 230, 233 (N.D. Ill. 1955) (20
year delay); United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 203 (D. Md.), aft'd mem.,
350 U.S. 857 (1955) (five years). Although these cases presumed prejudice, no
test was given to determine at what point such a presumption arises.
63. See United States v. Hines, 455 F.2d 1317, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1972) and United
States v. Holt, 448 F.2d 1108, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). These cases balanced
the four factors to determine whether a speedy trial had been abridged. However,
as to length of delay the longer the delay the heavier the burden was on the gov-
ernment to show that the right to speedy trial had not been violated. The court in
People v. Gray, 7 Ill. App.3d 526, 531, 288 N.E.2d 26, 29 (1972) refused to
recognize a three year delay as creating a presumption but noted: "The extended pe-
riod of purposeless delay would appear to approach the limit of delay beyond which
prejudice would be presumed as a matter of law."
64. See, e.g., Short v. Cardwell, 444 F.2d 1368, 1369 (6th Cir. 1971).
65. See Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 20 STAN. L. REV. 476, 477-78 (1968)
[hereinafter referred to as Note, Speedy Trial]; contra, United States v. Holt, 448
F.2d 1108, 1108-1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
66. United States v. Hem, 331 F. Supp. 472 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
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2. Reason for the Delay
In determining the reason for a delay the courts are actually seeking
to discover who caused the delay, which is determined by finding: (1)
the source of the delay, and (2) the motive or reason for the delay. 7
(a) Source Of The Delay
It is evident that "[a] defendant cannot complain of delays attributable
to himself,"6 8 such as delays caused by his pre-trial motions or dilatory
pleadings. 9 Also he may not complain of delays caused by his incom-
petency to stand trial, 70 from his express or implied consent to delays
caused by the government, 71 or from his fleeing from justice. 72 The pres-
ence of such factual circumstances would show that the defendant waived
his constitutional right to a speedy trial.73
67. Note, Speedy Trial, supra note 65, at 478 n.15.
68. See, e.g., United States v. Kabot, 295 F.2d 848, 852 (2d Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 803 (1962); Note, Speedy Trial, supra note 65, at 480.
69. See, e.g., Osborne v. United States, 371 F.2d 913, 925-26 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 387 U.S. 946 (1967); Sawyer v. Barczak, 229 F.2d 805, 812 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 966 (1956); Note, Speedy Trial, supra note 65, at 480.
For a discussion of the legality of assuming a waiver of a speedy trial where one
asserts his right to a valid indictment where the first indictment is invalid, see
Province, The Defendant's Dilemma: Valid Charge or Speedy Trial, 6 CRIM. L.
BULL. 421 (1970).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 365 F.2d 251, 255 (6th Cir. 1966); How-
ard v. United States, 261 F.2d 729, 730 (5th Cir. 1958); Note, Speedy Trial, supra
note 65, at 480.
71. See, e.g., Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 36 (1970); Mattoon v. Rhay,
313 F.2d 683, 684-85 (9th Cir. 1963); United States v. Algranati, 239 F. Supp.
116, 116-17 (S.D. N.Y. 1965). Note however, that failure to demand a speedy trial
is no longer deemed a waiver of that right. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
72. See Morland v. United States, 193 F.2d 297, 298 (10th Cir. 1951).
73. In addition to the constitutional right to a speedy trial many states have
statutes which implement this right, but are not coextensive with constutional safe-
guards. People v. Nowak, 45 Ill.2d 158, 258 N.E.2d 313 (1970). See Note,
Lagging Right, supra note 41, at 1590-91, for a list of such state statutes.
In Illinois the time limits of 120 days while in custody and 160 days for those
released on bail or personal recognizance has been strictly interpreted against the
state, placing an affirmative duty upon the state to comply with them. People v.
Siglar, 127 Ill. App.2d 256, 261 N.E.2d 27 (1970). However, certain circum-
stances toll the running of the time period and are deemed to be a waiver of the
defendant's statutory right. Examples of such circumstances are: a plea of
guilty, People v. Hickman, 3 Ill. App.3d 919, 280 N.E.2d 787 (1971); delay
caused by the defendant, People v. Ellis, 4 Ill. App.3d 585, 281 N.E.2d 405
(1972); a defendant's motion for a severance, People v. Bombacino, 51 Ill.2d 17,
280 N.E.2d 697 (1972); and where a defendant requests or agrees to a continuance,
People v. Dawson, 3 Ill. App.3d 668, 279 N.E.2d 483 (1972). See Banfield and
Anderson, Continuances in the Cook County Criminal Courts, 35 U. CHL L. Rnv.
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There is dictum to the effect that congestion in a court's docket and the
lack of judicial manpower may excuse a delay. 74 Some courts have ac-
cepted this delay as reasonable and have held it does not violate the right
to a speedy trial,75 while others have held it is no excuse. 76 Dictum in
the Barker decision asserts that such delay is a "neutral reason" and it
should be weighed less against the government than deliberate delay.
77
Yet it is still a barrier to the attainment of a constitutional right and
should not be countenanced as a source or a reason for a delay.
(b) Motive Or Reason For The Delay
This factor generally only comes into question where there is govern-
mental delay, which must then be inspected to see if an objectionable
motive or reason existed. A deliberate attempt by the prosecution to in-
jure the defendant's case has been termed "purposeful or oppressive,"
and is clearly unjustifiable. 78 Such a delay should be weighed heavily
against the government. 79  However, a bad faith intent by the govern-
ment to harm the defendant is not necessary; it is enough that the gov-
ernment has made a "deliberate choice for a supposed advantage. 80
Therefore, delays resulting from unreasonably prolonging an investiga-
tion,8 ' from filing charges in a district of doubtful venue,8 2 and from dis-
259 (1968), for the relation between the strategy of continuances and how it effects
a speedy trial.
74. See Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion in Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S.
30, 38 (1970).
75. See, e.g., King v. United States, 265 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 998 (1959); McDonald v. Hudspeth, 113 F.2d 984, 986 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 311 U.S. 683 (1940); United States v. Verville, 281 F. Supp.
591, 593 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Note, Speedy Trial, supra note 65, at 480.
76. See United States v. Strunk, 467 F.2d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd on
other grounds, 41 U.S.L.W. 4794 (U.S. June 11, 1973) (understaffed office argu-
ment rejected as the reason for an eight month delay from indictment to arraign-
ment); Leon v. Baker, 238 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1970) (Florida Supreme Court held that
delays emanating from crowded dockets do not toll the speedy trial statute). See
also Comment, Criminal Law: Crowded Dockets No Longer Justify Denial Of
Speedy Trial, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 603 (1971).
77. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972).
78. Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957).
79. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972).
80. United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 202 (D. Md.), aff'd mem.,
350 U.S. 857 (1955).
81. The Circuit Court of the District of Columbia has created as a rule of court
that pre-prosecution delay caused by an undercover investigation will be ques-
tioned if it exceeds four months and the defendant is able to show (1) "plausible"
prejudice, and (2) that the evidence against the defendant consists solely of the
undercover agent's uncorroborated testimony refreshed from a notebook. Woody
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missing one charge and reindicting a defendant on a related charge"8
have been held to violate the speedy trial and due process guarantees.
3. The Defendant's Assertion of His Right
A defendant can always waive his right to a speedy trial and, as
noted previously, many actions are considered to waive this right.8 4 How-
ever, around the speedy trial guarantee there also grew what has been
referred to as the "demand-waiver doctrine" under which an accused
must demand a speedy trial in order to avail himself of his sixth amend-
ment right. Failure to demand a speedy trial was considered to be an
implied waiver of the right.8 5 At one time this doctrine was unanimously
followed by the federal courts8 6 and most state courts.8 7  However, in
the past few years there has been an eroding of demand-waiver unanim-
ity, with some federal circuit courts placing a positive duty on the prose-
cution to secure a speedy trial, and not for the defendant to demand it.88
This has come about because of the high value that courts now place on
v. United States, 370 F.2d 214, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Ross v. United States,
349 F.2d 210, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
82. United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 191 (D. Md.), aff'd, mem.,
350 U.S. 857 (1955).
83. United States v. Burke, 224 F. Supp. 41, 46-47 (D.D.C. 1963).
84. See notes 68-74 and accompanying text supra.
85. A defendant's failure to make a demand was seen to indicate that he was
responsible for the delay and, therefore, was merged with the reason or cause for
the delay. Also a failure to make a demand was viewed as indicating that he was
in some way profiting from his delay, and thus no prejudice to the defendant could
occur. Therefore, waiver had no independent significance but rather was seen as
negating the other factors used to determine the sixth amendment violation. See
Note, Speedy Trial, supra note 65, at 479-80.
There were three generally recognized exceptions to the demand doctrine: (1)
Inability to assert the speedy trial right because of imprisonment, ignorance, or
lack of legal advice; See, e.g., United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475, 478 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958); United States v. Chase, 135 F. Supp.
230 (N.D. Ill. 1955); (2) Ignorance of the pending charge; See, e.g., United
States v. Lustman, supra at 478; Taylor v. United States, 238 F.2d 259, 261 (D.C.
Cir. 1956); (3) Trial in a district of improper venue; See, e.g., United States v.
Gladding, 265 F. Supp. 850, 855 (S.D. N.Y. 1966); United States v. Provoo,
17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md.), aff'd, 350 U.S. 857 (1955).
86. Note, Lagging Right, supra note 41, at 1602.
87. Note, Lagging Right, supra note 41, at 1604. However, eight states rejected
the demand-waiver doctrine. Id. See also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 524
(1972).
88. See United States v. Mark H Electronics of La. Inc., 305 F. Supp. 1280,
1284-87 (E.D. La. 1969); United States v. Mann, 291 F. Supp. 268, 274 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
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the voluntary waiver of constitutional rights.8 9
In Barker v. Wingo the Supreme Court rejected the demand-waiver doc-
trine90 stating that: "[a] defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial;
the State has that duty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is
consistent with due process. ... 91 The Court held that presuming
waiver of a fundamental right from inaction was inconsistent with its pre-
vious pronouncements on waiver of constitutional rights because it is not
based on "'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege.' "92 Furthermore, the Court related that the nature of
the speedy trial guarantee makes it "impossible to pinpoint a precise time
in the process when the right must be asserted or waived, but that fact
does not argue for placing the burden of protecting the right solely on
defendants."93
Because of the particular interests of society in this guarantee the Court
saw that the duty of swift prosecutions is on society's representatives. 94
However, the Court noted that in previous fundamental right cases it had
placed the entire burden on the prosecution to show a knowing and vol-
untary waiver, but because of the uniqueness of the speedy trial right it
could not be certain when and under what circumstances a defendant
must assert his right or it will be waived.9 5 Therefore the Court refused
to state that a defendant has no responsibility to assert his right96 empha-
sizing that "[f]ailure to assert the right will make it difficult for a de-
fendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial." 97
This latter language of the Court appears confusing in light of the fact
that the Court had previously stated that a "[d]efendant has no duty to
bring himself to trial . .."98 but rather the prosecution has such a duty. 99
The facts of Barker show that a large part of the delay was caused by
89. See ABA Standards, supra note 26, at § 2.2 which suggests that the demand
rule be explicitly eliminated in any speedy trial rule or statute.
90. 407 U.S. 514, 528 (1972).
91. Id. at 527. Cf. United States v. Chase, 135 F. Supp. 230, 233 (N.D. Ill.
1955) where the court stated that "[t]o require a man to beg for a trial on such a
charge, with its enormous penalty, requires too much of human nature."
92. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525 (1972).
93. Id. at 527.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 529.
96. Id. at 528.
97. Id. at 532.
98. Id. at 527. See also the text accompanying note 91 supra.
99. Id. at 527. See also the text accompanying note 94 supra.
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the Commonwealth's attempt to convict an alleged co-defendant (Man-
ning) so that he could testify at Barker's trial. 100 The Court then bal-
anced the four factors in light of the facts and determined that the preju-
dice was "minimal" because no witnesses were missing and only two
"Cvery minor" lapses of memory occurred, one on the part of the prosecu-
tion.' 0 ' Moreover, the Court found that: "[m]ore important than the
absence of serious prejudice, is the fact that Barker did not want a speedy
trial.1' 0 2 The Court stated that it thought Barker was "gambling" on the
acquittal of Manning and thus did not want a speedy trial because the
state's case would be weak without Manning's testimony. 03 Therefore,
the Court refused to rule that his constitutional right was denied because
the record disclosed that the defendant did not want a speedy trial.' 04
We are left with a decision in Barker which speaks of a defendant hav-
ing no duty to bring himself to trial and rejecting the demand doctrine
as not consistent with the waiver of constitutional rights. Yet the entire
case turns on the defendant not demanding a trial which he has no duty
to bring himself to, his failure to do so being viewed as a tactical measure
which was impermissible (to strengthen his case) and thus is treated as
showing a waiver of his right. The delay by the prosecution was also a
tactical measure to strengthen its case. But the Court did not even speak
of this reason for the delay when it purportedly balanced the factors, al-
though it was one of the criteria the Court itself had set for determining
whether the speedy trial right had been abridged.
4. Prejudice to the Defendant
The fourth factor used in determining if an accused has been denied
his constitutional right to a speedy trial is prejudice.' 05 There are three
100. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the petitioner was not brought
to trial for murder until more than five years after he had been arrested, during
which time the prosecution obtained 16 continuances. The first 14 of these were
in order to postpone the state's case until the second suspect Manning was con-
victed and thus any self-incrimination aspects of his testifying against Barker could
be removed. Barker did not object to the first 11 continuances over a three year pe-
riod but objected to the twelfth one and filed a motion to dismiss the indictment
which was denied. From February 1959, to February 1963, the state received 14
continuances in order to convict Manning, which it finally did after six trials.
101. Id. at 534.
102. Id.
103. id. at 534-36.
104. Id. at 536.
105. Prejudice has been seen by some courts as the most important factor of the
four. See, e.g., United States v. Menke, 339 F. Supp. 1023 (W.D. Pa. 1972);
United States v. Hem, 331 F. Supp. 472 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
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divisions of issues to be inspected in order to determine prejudice: (a)
what the different types of prejudice are, (b) whether a showing of preju-
dice is necessary, and (c) if so, who has the burden of proof.
(a) Types Of Prejudice
Prejudice should always be assessed in the light of the interests of de-
fendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. Three such
interests are: (1) to prevent undue and oppressive pre-trial incarcera-
tion; (2) to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusa-
tion; and (3) to limit the possible impairment of the ability of an accused
to defend himself. 10 6 The first two types of prejudice can be referred to
collectively as prejudice to the person of the accused, and appear to be
relatively unimportant in most speedy trial determinations. 10 7 The third
factor, referred to as prejudice to the defense, is the most serious one be-
cause the inability of a defendant to adequately prepare his case shows
the unfairness of the entire system upon which he is prosecuted. 10 8 A de-
lay which causes the loss of potential witnesses, memories to fade, and
documents or physical evidence to be lost is clearly prejudicial to a de-
fendant's case.' 09 As a general rule the extent to which a delay has re-
sulted in actual prejudice is an essential factor in determining whether
there has been a violation of the speedy trial guarantee." 0 Some courts
106. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966). See also 'Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972).
107. See Note, Speedy Trial, supra note 65, at 495; where the author notes
that the threat of undue incarceration is often discounted by bail (although it
should be recognized that this is not always the case). Even so, the absence of
anxiety will not defeat a speedy trial claim. State v. Couture, 156 Me. 231, 163
A.2d 646 (1960).
108. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972); Note, Speedy Trial, supra
note 65, at 495.
109. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972); Dickey v. Florida, 398
U.S. 30, 38 (1970); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).
110. See United States v. Deloney, 389 F.2d 324, 326 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 904 (1968); Tynan v. United States, 376 F.2d 761, 762-64
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 845 (1967); Urguidi v. United States,
371 F.2d 654, 655 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 879 (1967). Cf. United
States v. Alo, 439 F.2d 751, 755-56 (2d Cir. 1971) (defendant must show either
actual prejudice or at least a credible possibility of prejudice). But cf. United
States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966), where the court stated: "[T]he Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial . . . is an important safeguard . . . to
limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend
himself." (emphasis added). See also Smith v. United States, 418 F.2d 1120,
1122 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 936 (1969) (dismissal of indictment re-
quired where defendant makes showing of reasonable likelihood of prejudice to his
defense).
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require that both prejudice and improper cause be shown."' Other
courts, however, require only that prejudice or improper cause be shown.112
(b) Whether A Showing Of Prejudice Is Necessary
The fact that some degree of prejudice needs to be shown appears on
its face to be inconsistent with the fact that there is no need to prove
any prejudice to show a violation of other sixth amendment rights. 11
Cases which have defined other sixth amendment rights turn on the fact
that to determine the degree of prejudice is unnecessary where a funda-
mental right is involved." 4  As noted in Mr. Justice Brennan's concur-
ring opinion in Dickey, when the fundamental sixth amendment right to a
speedy trial is at stake "it may be equally realistic and necessary to as-
sume prejudice once the accused shows that he was denied a rapid prose-
cution." 115 Moreover, the plain text of the sixth amendment accords
identical stature to each of the rights enumerated therein. The amend-
ment is but a single sentence, a listing of separate rights, each of which
is guaranteed to an accused in all criminal prosecutions. As the text is
one of guarantee to an accused, there should not be any requirement forc-
ing a defendant to show prejudice in order to receive what the Constitu-
tional language grants to all accused citizens. The amendment does not
speak of prejudice, but rather, of protection of rights which must inher-
ently "prejudice" an accused in detracting from his liberty.
Furthermore, in the Bill of Rights there are eleven procedural guaran-
tees that promote the reliability of the criminal guilt-determination proc-
ess.116 Of these all but the due process and speedy trial guarantees need
111. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 369 F.2d 936, 939 (4th Cir. 1966);
United States v. Simmons, 338 F.2d 804, 807 (2d Cir. 1964).
112. See, e.g., United States v. Kaufman, 393 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1098 (1969); Fleming v. United States, 378 F.2d 502, 504 (1st
Cir. 1967); Reece v. United States, 337 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1964). Note that
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), has set up a balancing test in which cause
of delay and prejudice are two of four factors to be considered in determining a
violation of the speedy trial right.
113. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to an impartial jury);
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (compulsory process); Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(right to counsel); In Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (right to a public trial).
114. See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1942).
115. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 54-55 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
116. These eleven are (1) the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, and (2) due process, (3) the eighth amendment prohibition against ex-
cessive bail, (4) the sixth amendment rights to a speedy trial, (5) public trial,
(6) with an impartial jury, (7) to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation, (8) to be tried in the district in which the crime was committed,
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not have actual prejudice shown in order for a court to hold that they
have been violated.'1 7 However, prejudice need not always be shown
in due process cases, for "at times a procedure employed by the State
involves such a probability that prejudice will result that it is deemed
inherently lacking in due process.""18 Thus the speedy trial guarantee is
viewed alone among the criminal procedural guarantees of the Bill of
Rights as always requiring the showing of actual prejudice rather than
inferring it from the procedure involved." 9
(c) Who Has The Burden Of Proving Prejudice
Therefore, since the deprivation of the sixth amendment right to speedy
trial does not per se prejudice an accused's ability to defend himself' 20
one must then determine upon whom the burden of proof to show preju-
dice, or the lack of it, should lie. The Supreme Court has not yet ruled
on who has this burden and the lower court cases appear to be divided into
three categories as to the burden of proof: (1) The accused must make
a showing of prejudice which is dispositive of the issue of prejudice; 12
(9) to confront the prosecution's witnesses, (10) to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses, and (11) to have the assistance of counsel. See Note, Speedy
Trial, supra note 65, at 494-95 n.131, for cases relating to and explaining these
rights.
117. Note, Speedy Trial, supra note 65, at 494 n.131.
118. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1965). See also Sheppard v. Max-
well, 384 U.S. 333, 352 (1966).
119. One court has held that an unreasonable delay in itself was sufficient for
dismissal without a showing of prejudice. United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958).
The eighth amendment right to bail, like the speedy trial right, is designed to
minimize incarceration prior to trial and assure that an accused will not be
hampered in his ability to prepare his defense. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4
(1951). But in determining whether a right to bail has been violated a court will
merely look to see if it is excessive and not as to prejudice. 342 U.S. at 4-5. To
determine whether the trial was given with all reasonable speed, without regard to
an inspection of whether prejudice to the defendant has actually occurred, such a
test should be adopted for the speedy trial right. It should be noted however, that
in aiming for a "speedy" trial one must not eliminate or by-pass fundamental pro-
cedural rights of an accused.
120. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 (1972).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966); Jackson v.
United States, 351 F.2d 821, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (a defendant has peculiar knowl-
edge of the facts which would constitute prejudice and therefore he should have
the burden of showing them; however, his burden is only to show a "plausible
claim" short of a preponderance); Von *Cseh v. Fay, 313 F.2d 620, 624 (2d Cir.
1963).
However, it would be almost impossible for a defendant to prove actual prejudice
if he cannot remember his activities. Also it is difficult to show the materiality of
unavailable evidence and the fact that it was available at one time, and next to
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(2) prejudice is presumed from long delay and such presumption is dis-
positive of the issue of prejudice;1 22 and (3) prejudice must be either
shown by the accused or presumed from long delay, but in either case
the government may overcome such proof or presumption by showing
either that the delay was the result of a valid police purpose or that the
accused suffered no serious prejudice other than that resulting from ordi-
nary and inevitable delay.' 2l
One author believes that the criteria of length of delay should deter-
mine who has the burden.' 24 He suggested that if a delay is short the
defendant should have the burden of establishing prejudice and unneces-
sary delay, as a check on frivolous claims. However, where a "substan-
tial" delay occurs the burden should be on the state to justify the delay
as necessary and proper. If the state is unable to do this then it is logical
and fair to require it to show that the defendant has not been prejudiced
by the delay.125
impossible to show the cost of delay in the dimmed memories of witnesses. See
Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 53 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); Note, Speedy
Trial, supra note 65, at 493-97.
122. United States v. Holt, 448 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
942 (1971) (prejudice is presumed and need not be affirmatively shown when the
delay in prosecution exceeds one year); United States v. Mann, 291 F. Supp. 268
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 198, 203 (D. Md.)
(alternative holding), afj'd mem., 350 U.S. 857 (1955); United States v. Chase,
135 F. Supp. 230, 233 (N.D. Ill. 1955) (20 year delay is so long that no inquiry
need be made into its cause); Rutherford v. State, 486 P.2d 946 (Alaska 1971). But
see United States v. Bishton, 463 F.2d 887, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (presumption of
prejudice arising from delay of 20 months must be weighed against other circum-
stances, delay held not to violate the sixth amendment); Pierce v. Lane, 302 F.2d
38 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 844 (1962) (prejudice not presumed after
an 18 year delay). See Note, 64 YALE L.J. 1208 (1955), for an argument that
prejudice should not be presumed.
Most modern state prompt trial statutes implicitly create a presumption of preju-
dice when a delay exceeds the statutory time limit as extended by specific exclu-
sions. Note, Speedy Trial Schemes and Criminal Justice Delay, 57 CORNELL
L. REv. 794, 814 (1972).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Deloney, 389 F.2d 324, 325 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 904 (1968) (dictum) (the government has the burden of
showing that delay, if it prejudiced the defendant, was the result of a valid police
purpose); Hanrahan v. United States, 348 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (the govern-
ment has the burden of showing that prejudice to a defendant was not greater than
that resulting from ordinary and inevitable delay); Commonwealth v. Clark, 443
Pa. 318, 279 A.2d 41 (1971) (once a defendant makes a prima facie showing of
prejudice, the burden is then on the state to show the absence of prejudice).
124. Note, Lagging Right, supra note 41, at 1620.
125. Id. But see Note, Speedy Trial, supra note 65, at 497, where the author
asserts that neither the defendant nor the government should have to prove actual
prejudice or its absence, but rather prejudice should not be a factor in the speedy
trial right.
COMMENTS
5. Balancing
In balancing the four factors given by the Barker decision neither of
them are regarded "as either a necessary or sufficient condition"'126 to a
finding of a violation of the sixth amendment speedy trial right. There-
fore, one factor alone may not be dispositive of the issue, but also the
finding of all four factors to be favorable to the accused or the govern-
ment is not necessary. The factors given by the Court have "no talismanic
qualities"'127 and courts must weigh both the conduct of the defendant
and the prosecution in a sensitive balancing process, while always mind-
ful that they are dealing with a fundamental right given an accused in
the Constitution. 28
TIME OF ATTACHMENT
There has been much discussion in recent years as to exactly when
the right to a speedy trial attaches. Generally courts have considered
four points in the criminal process at which the guarantee might begin:
(1) when the alleged crime is committed; (2) when the government de-
cides to prosecute and has enough evidence to proceed against an indi-
vidual; (3) when a defendant is arrested; and (4) when he is formally
charged with a crime, either by indictment or information. The first two
time periods are termed the pre-prosecution period and will be consid-
ered together.
1. The Pre-prosecution Period
The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Marion held that
the right to a speedy trial does attach to pre-prosecution delay.' 29 The
Court noted that no federal court of appeals had ever reversed a convic-
tion or dismissed an indictment solely on the constitutional grounds of the
sixth amendment's speedy trial provision where only pre-indictment delay
had been involved.'8 0 The view that this right only applied when a
prosecution had been formally initiated by an arrest or indictment, and
126. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972).
127. Id.
128. id.
129. 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
130. Id. at 315. The Court in stating this fact gives an extensive list of cases
in its support. Id. at 315-17 n.8. In all these cases the defendant had alleged
that he was prejudiced by the delay. However, in Marion "[n]o specific prejudice
was claimed or demonstrated .... ." Id. at 310; rather, the 38 month delay be-
tween the crime and the indictment was claimed to be inherently prejudicial. Id.
at 313.
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thus there was an "accused" as by the sixth amendment's terminology,
was almost unanimously ingrained in precedent.13'
Prior to Marion this conventional rule was criticized by some judges
and authors 13 2 and at least three federal district court decisions applied
the speedy trial right to pre-prosecution delay.' 83  Also six circuits had
ruled that pre-indictment delay would be grounds for dismissal. How-
ever, these cases were treated basicly as due process violations requiring
a showing of actual prejudice, with an occasional mention of the sixth
amendment speedy trial right.'3 4  One circuit and two federal district
courts in their decisions have spoken of due process but primarily based
their dismissals of indictments on violation of the speedy trial right, 3 5
and the District of Columbia Circuit has applied the right to pre-prosecu-
tion delays by its supervisory power.'13
However, because of Marion it is now clear that the sixth amendment
will afford no protection to those not yet "accused," nor does it require
the government to "discover, investigate, and accuse any person within
131. Note, Lagging Right, supra note 41, at 1613. Arguably the term "accused"
refers solely to the issue of standing. Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293,
310 (1966) (no constitutional right to be arrested, a person not yet charged with a
crime has no standing to complain of prosecutorial delay nor to compel the govern-
ment to begin a prosecution against him). Therefore, it may be possible for an
individual, once he is arrested or formally charged, to have standing to then chal-
lenge delays dating back to the time of the alleged offense.
132. Nickens v. United States, 323 F.2d 808, 812-13 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Wright,
J. concurring), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 905 (1964); Harlow v. United States, 301
F.2d 361, 375 (5th Cir. 1962) (Rives, J., concurring); Speedy Trial, supra note 65,
at 488-90; Note, Lagging Right, supra note 41, at 1613-15.
133. United States v. Wahrer, 319 F. Supp. 585 (D. Alaska 1970); United
States v. Parrott, 248 F. Supp. 196 (D.D.C. 1965); United States v. Burke, 224
F. Supp. 41 (D.D.C. 1963). See also State v. Johnson, 3 N.C.App. 420, 165
S.E.2d 27, rev'd on other grounds, 275 N.C. 264, 272, 167 S.E.2d 274, 279 (1969)
(the sixth amendment should be equally applied to potential defendants). See Note,
48 N.C. L. REV. 121 (1969).
134. Acree v. United States, 418 F.2d 427, 430 (10th Cir. 1969); United States
v. Capaldo, 402 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 989 (1969);
United States v. Napue, 401 F.2d 107, 114-15 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1024 (1969); Schlinsky v. United States, 379 F.2d 735, 737 (1st Cir. 1967);
United States v. Harbin, 377 F.2d 78, 79-80 (4th Cir. 1967); Lucas v. United
States, 363 F.2d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 1966).
135. Taylor v. United States, 238 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1956); United States v.
McWilliams, 163 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1947); United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D.
183 (D. Md.), aff'd mem., 350 U.S. 857 (1955); United States v. Chase, 135 F.
Supp. 230 (N.D. Il. 1955). See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 315-17 n.8
(1971), for a view that these cases are really due process decisions.
136. Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1965). But see Loth-
ridge v. United States, 441 F.2d 919 (6th Cir. 1971).
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any particular period of time.' 1 37  It appears that the Court's refusal to
extend the sixth amendment right might be because of the procedural
problems that would occur from its enforcement. There might be a need
for lengthy hearings of proof as to the diligence of prosecuting authori-
ties,1 38 which might arguably lengthen the time of trial rather than shorten
it. 1 39
The Court in Marion supported its decision by stating four factors upon
which it relied. The first of these was the fact that:
On its face, the protection of the Amendment is activated only when a criminal
prosecution has begun and extends only to those persons who have been "accused" in
the course of that prosecution.' 40
The sixth amendment's language clearly shows that all its guarantees apply
only to an "accused." However, in applying the sixth amendment right to
counsel guarantee the Supreme Court itself has extended this right to pre-
prosecution delay in Escobedo v. llinois141 and Miranda v. Arizona.1
42
In Escobedo the Court found that the right to counsel attached to an
"accused" prior to arrest or indictment. The Court stated that to require
an "accused" to be arrested before the right attached "would exalt form
over substance . . .- 143 and stated that the right attached when "the
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
137. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971). Cf. Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966) where the Supreme Court stated: "[tihere is no
constitutional right to be arrested. The police are not required to guess at their peril
the precise moment at which they have probable cause to arrest a suspect, risking a
violation of the Fourth Amendment if they act too soon, and a violation of the
Sixth Amendment if they wait too long." (footnotes omitted).
138. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321 n.13 (1971); Note, Jus-
tice Overdue-Speedy Trial for the Potential Defendant, 5 STAN. L. REV. 95, 101-02
(1952).
139. In regards to a defendant such a delay would be a voluntary waiver to
toll the speedy trial right. However, the right has been viewed as also for the
protection of society and thus may be an infringement on society's right. Barker
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
140. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971). With this the Court
answered a question posed by Mr. Justice Brennan in Dickey v. Florida, 398
U.S. 30 (1970): "Can it be that one becomes an 'accused' only after he is indicted,
or that the Sixth Amendment subdivides 'prosecution' into various stages, granting
the right to speedy trial in some and withholding it in others?" Id. at 44 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring).
141. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
142. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda followed Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964), finding that the sixth amendment right to counsel attached prior to
formal arrest or indictment. 384 U.S. at 444.
143. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 486 (1964).
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begun to focus on a particular suspect ... ." Therefore, logically the
first right guaranteed to an "accused" by the sixth amendment, that of a
speedy trial, should also attach prior to formal arrest or indictment. In
assessing the pre-prosecution delay, in regards to the speedy trial right, a
court should inspect the nature of the events of delay and their effects on
the rights of those involved, finding a denial of the right where years of
unexplained and inexcusable pre-indictment delay occur.14
The second factor upon which the Marion Court based its decision was
the fact that: "Our attention is called to nothing in the circumstances sur-
rounding the adoption of the Amendment indicating that it does not mean
what it appears to say . . . . ',"40 There is practically no historical data as
to the intent of the writers when they enacted the speedy trial guarantee. 147
Therefore, it has been noted by the Supreme Court that it is reasonable to
construe this intent in light of the common law sources from which the
framers received their legal education.' 48
In neither the Magna Carta nor Coke's commentaries thereon is any dis-
tinction drawn as to the stage of the process in which delay or denial
of right occurs.' 49 Furthermore, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679
did not speak of a distinction between attachment before or after prose-
cution had begun.' 50 In fact the English common law with which the
144. Id. at 490-91. In relation to construing the word "charged" as used in
Article IV, section 2 of the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court has
stated that it applies when "an affidavit is filed, alleging the commission of an
offense and a warrant is issued for his arrest, .... " not when formal arrest itself
occurs. In Re Strauss, 197 U.S. 324, 331 (1905). Therefore, in both instances
where the Constitution imposes a duty on the government to act on criminal matters
only at a specific time, the Supreme Court has construed such duty to attach previ-
ous to formal arrest.
145. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 333 (1971) (Douglas, J., con-
curring).
146. Id. at 313-14 (emphasis added). It is significant that the briefs in this
case (Marion's, Cratch's, one amicus curiae brief, and the government's brief) re-
fer to the historical development of the adoptive meaning of this amendment only
in a few pages. The Court itself noted that the evidence of this history was
"meager." Id. at 314 n.6.
147. Note, Speedy Trial, supra note 65, at 484.
148. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223-26 (1967).
149. Id. at 224.
150. 31 Charles II, ch. 2 (1679). It may be argued that this Act did not
speak of such a distinction because it only affected those already imprisoned. How-
ever, it should also be noted that the Act only applied to felonies and did not speak
of public trials, while the sixth amendment does not distinguish between crimes and
provides for a public trial. Therefore, this Act should not be seen as a shorthand
version of the sixth amendment and is only useful to show who an accused was
intended to be according to the Act. The Act noted that one could have the
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framers were familiar conceived of a criminal prosecution as being com-
menced prior to indictment. 151 The common law "criminal process" was
commenced by the filing of a civil lawsuit by a private citizen, who there-
after had to file an application for criminal prosecution calling for an
accused to show cause why he should not be imprisoned. 1 2 Therefore,
the "criminal prosecution" commenced prior to "indictment" or formal
"arrest" and thus the individual was an "accused" prior to being "arrested"
or "indicted.' 158 One of the earliest cases showing that no distinction
was made between pre-trial and post-trial delay at common law was
Rex v. Robinson154 which was decided prior to our Declaration of Inde-
pendence and Constitution. In Robinson, Lord Mansfield refused a mo-
tion for a criminal information against the defendant on the ground that
over two years had lapsed since the alleged offense and the delay was not
accounted for.' 55
The Marion Court listed the third factor upon which it based its deci-
sion as
[legislative efforts to implement federal and state speedy trial provisions also
plainly reveal the view that these guarantees are applicable only after a person
has been accused of a crime. 1 5 6
However, what the Congress or state legislatures do, or do not do, should
benefit of the right to release where he was not indicted prior to a set time, thus
the Act at least extended to pre-indictment if not the pre-arrest period. Kutner,
supra note 15.
151. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 329 (1971) (Douglas, J., con-
curring).
152. Dession, CRIMINAL LAW, ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC ORDER 356 (1948);
1 J. Stephen, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 493-96 (1883).
153. See notes 151 and 152 supra. See also Schwartz, Cases and Materials on
Professional Responsibility and the Administration of Criminal Justice 2-3 (Nat.
Council of Legal Clinics 1961), for an annotation of the evolution of the English
system.
154. 1 Black. W. 541, 96 Eng. Rep. 313 (K.B. 1765).
155. Id. at 542, 96 Eng. Rep. at 313-14. See also Regina v. Robins, 1 Cox Crim.
Cas. 114 (Somerset Winter Assizes, 1844) where a two year delay was occasioned
by the failure of a private party to file a complaint, and not by police inaction.
The court applied a standard of fundamental fairness stating that "[ilt is monstrous
to put a man on . . ; trial after such a lapse of time . . ." where no satisfactory
explanation was given for the delay. See also Nickens v. United States, 323 F.2d
808, 810 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 905 (1964).
156. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 316-17 (1971). This Court noted
that the federal implementary rule, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b), only
applies to post-arrest situations. Id. at 312. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 26,
at 14-15 for a comprehensive list of state statutes. These statutes generally are
triggered from "date of custody." See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 103-5(a)
(1969).
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have no bearing upon the meaning of a fundamental constitutional guar-
antee which has already been held applicable to the states. Inasmuch
as the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, the actions of the states
in regard to it must be judged by its meaning. The process should not
be such that the Constitution is judged by the meaning of state or con-
gressional statutes (except where it is absolutely necessary). Here it is
not imperative that the states or Congress be sought for advice, since the
historical precedents for the sixth amendment are enough to show the in-
tent of its writers.
In relation to the interval between the commission of the offense and
when an arrest or indictment occurs, the Marion Court held that the stat-
ute of limitations exclusively delimits the time during which an accused
is exposed to prosecution. 157 However, the first statute of limitations was
adopted by Congress in 1790,158 one year after the sixth amendment was
adopted. Therefore, Congress could not possibly have been according
non-existent statutes with any capacity to affect, let alone to attain equal
status with a section of the Bill of Rights. The sixth amendment was in-
tended by the framers to safeguard the rights of an accused. They could
hardly have intended to leave these rights to the legislative power with-
out any reference to the Constitutional prescription enforceable in the
courts.' 59  Therefore, an analysis reveals that statutes of limitations
"merely represent the maximum period beyond which a prosecution can-
not be brought, and do not preclude judicial inquiry into the constitu-
tionality of delays within that period ... .
Furthermore, there is no federal statute of limitations for capital
crimes.' 6 ' Thus, if the statute of limitations is a bar to pre-arrest delay,
arguably the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial should at least apply
157. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971). The Court noted that
a statute of limitations provides "predictability by specifying a limit beyond which
there is an irrebuttable presumption that a defendant's right to a fair trial would be
prejudiced." Id. at 322 (footnote omitted). See also Nickens v. United States,
323 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 905 (1964); Hoopengarner
v. United States, 270 F.2d 465 (6th Cir. 1959).
158. 1 Stat. 112, 119 (1790) (2 year statute of limitations for non-capital
cases; 3 years for capital offense).
159. See Note, Lagging Right, supra note 41, at 1614.
160. Note, Speedy Trial, supra note 65, at 492. Moreover, delay and prejudice
can be seen to equal laches and may arguably be seen to apply to the time period
during the statute of limitations. See Note, Justice Overdue-Speedy Trial for the
Potential Defendant, 5 STAN. L. REV. 95, 102-03 (1952). In exceptional cases
laches will override a statute of limitation. H. MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY 75 (2d ed.
1948). See also Note, Justice Overdue, supra at 104.
161. 18 U.S.C. § 3281 (1972).
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to pre-arrest delay in capital offenses. However, the sixth amendment
does not distinguish on its face between capital and non-capital crimes
162
and if the right can be invoked at any time in capital cases it should also
apply to non-capital cases. The existence of a legislative statute can
never foreclose a fundamental constitutional right, and thus it can only be
seen as an outer bound and not as forestalling standing to complain of
an infringement of the constitutional right which occurs during the time
period.
The Court in Marion noted that "the statute of limitations does not
fully define the appellee's rights with respect to the events occurring prior
to indictment ... ,,163 and that where "actual prejudice" which is
caused by an "intentional device" is present the due process clause might
require dismissal of an indictment.' 64 However, it should be noted that
there is an added difficulty in showing actual prejudice in pre-arrest delay
situations.' 65
The fourth factor upon which the Marion decision was based was the
assertion that:
It is apparent . . .that very little support for appellees' position emerges from a
consideration of the purposes of the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial provision
.166
162. Note also that an "accused" has a sixth amendment right to counsel in
both capital and non-capital cases. See generally Note, Lagging Right, supra note
41, at 1614.
163. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971).
164. Id. at 324. It is not clear whether both of these factors need be present for
a violation of due process to be recognized. The Marion Court in citing these two
merely recognized that the government in its brief had conceded that where both
were present, then a fifth amendment due process violation would appear. Brief
for the Government at 26-27, United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971). There-
fore, the mere presence of one of these factors may be enough to show a violation
of the fifth amendment. Cf. United States v. Daley, 454 F.2d 505, 508 (Ist Cir.
1972), where the court stated: "[s]ince neither actual prejudice nor purposeful
governmental delay has been shown, the pre-indictment time lapse is irrelevant
. ... (emphasis added). See generally notes 111 and 112 and accompanying text
supra, for examples of how these two factors are regarded in sixth amendment
speedy trial cases.
In both the Marion and Barker cases the delay was an "intentional (tactical)
device" used by the government to strengthen its case and gain an advantage over
the defendant, however, in neither case did the defendant prove actual prejudice
(Marion did not plead actual but merely "possible" prejudice). Thus, if these two
factors are to be considered, or one alone, it appears the showing of actual preju-
dice, with the burden being on he who pleads it, will be the prime requirement to
show a fifth amendment due process violation.
165. See note 179 and accompanying text infra.
166. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971).
19731
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Mr. Justice White in delivering the opinion of the Court in Marion stated
that "the major evils protected against by the speedy trial guarantee exist
quite apart from actual or possible prejudice to an accused's defense.' 16 7
In light of United States v. Ewell,'68 and the cases interpeting its provi-
sions as to the interests the speedy trial right was designed to protect,
16 9
this statement is clearly erroneous. Primarily the sixth amendment right
was designed to protect against the possible impairment of the ability of
an accused to defend himself.' 70 However, Justice White focused upon
the fact that a citizen prior to arrest "suffers no restraints on his liberty
and is not the subject of public accusation: his situation does not com-
pare with that of a defendant who has been arrested and held to an-
swer. .... 1"7 Furthermore, he discarded the fact that delay may pos-
sibly interfere with the accused's ability to defend himself.'
72
As noted previously post-arrest delay may have a prejudicial effect
on a defendant.173 However, where lengthy delay occurs prior to arrest
the prejudicial effect is often greater.' 74  Where a defendant does not
know of an investigation he may allow evidence to be destroyed, while
the government with its knowledge of a possible criminal prosecution will
preserve its evidence. He has no notice of the pending criminal charges
and thus has no inducement to preserve evidence, his own memory, or
the memories of his possible witnesses. 175 Also during this time he does
not generally have the help of an attorney because he has not yet been
arrested, therefore, he loses the aid of an expert who could help him in
167. Id. at 320.
168. 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).
169. See generally notes 106-10 and accompanying text supra.
170. Notes 108 and 109 and accompanying text supra.
171. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321 (1971). Although one not yet
arrested suffers no restraints on his liberty he may, where he is known (as in the
case of Marion), be subject to public accusation. "Indeed, the protection underlying
the right to a speedy trial may be denied when a citizen is damned by clandestine
innuendo and never given the chance promptly to defend himself in a court of
law." Id. at 331 (Douglas, J., concurring).
172. Id. at 321-22.
173. See text accompanying note 105 supra.
174. See United States v. Kaufman, 393 F.2d 172, 175 (7th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1098 (1969).
175. See United States v. Kaufman, 393 F.2d 172, 175 (7th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1098 (1969); Hardy v. United States, 343 F.2d 233, 235 (D.C.
Cir. 1964) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 984 (1965); Nickens v.
United States, 323 F.2d 808, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (concurring opinion), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 905 (1964). Where a prospective defendant does not know of
pending charges he would not be required to (nor under present standing principles
can he) demand a speedy trial.
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searching for useful witnesses and determining which evidence needs to
be preserved.17
Generally a defendant is required to prove actual prejudice when he
complains that his fifth amendment due process right 177 or sixth amend-
ment speedy trial right 178 has been violated. But it is almost impossible
for a defendant to prove actual prejudice if he cannot remember his ac-
tivities on the date of the alleged offense. 179 Without notice a prospective
defendant cannot devote his powers of recall to solidify his memory of
recent events. On the other hand, "the State may proceed methodically
to build its case while the prospective defendant proceeds to lose his."' 80
Thus in a very real sense, the extent to which a defendant is prejudiced
by a governmental delay is evidenced by the difficulty he encounters in
establishing with particularity the elements of that actual prejudice.' 8 '
Furthermore, in inspecting the purposes of the sixth amendment, which
the Marion Court attempted to do, it is evident that it imposes a duty upon
government officials to proceed expeditiously with criminal prosecutions.
However, this purpose will have little meaning if these officials are al-
lowed to determine ex parte when that duty is to commence.' 82
2. The Prosecution Period
The third and fourth periods in the criminal process in which the
speedy trial right may possibly attach are when a person is arrested or
where he is formally charged with a crime. Although at one time some
courts did not view the right as attaching upon arrest,' 83 it is now seen as
176. He also does not have the aid of criminal discovery because the right to
discovery does not commence prior to indictment. See Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963). One of the aids of discovery is that it leads to other avenues of
factual exploration, but by the time one is arrested the avenues may have ended.
177. Cases cited note 164 supra.
178. Notes 121-23 and accompanying text supra.
179. A crime of violence may be more readily remembered, if in fact the de-
fendant was the one who committed it; but where there is a crime such as business
fraud, as was the case in United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971), it will be
extremely difficult for a defendant to recall the transactions, even if in fact he
committed the crime. Moreover, where one is innocent it would be next to im-
possible, after lengthy delay, for him to remember what he did on a specific day or
persons who could be witnesses for him. See generally Note, The Potential De-
fendant's Right to a Speedy Trial, 48 N.C. L. REV. 121, 127 (1969).
180. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 331 (1971) (Douglas, J., con-
curring).
181. See Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
182. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 331 (1971) (Douglas, J., con-
curring).
183. See, e.g., Bruce v. United States, 351 F.2d 318, 320 (5th Cir. 1965).
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attaching at this point.' 84 The common law history of the development
of the guarantee suggests that it was intended to attach at least by the
time of arrest.' 85 Moreover, one who has been arrested is clearly an
"accused" within the literal meaning of that word contained in the sixth
amendment.
Similarly the speedy trial right attaches where one is "accused" by in-
dictment or information.' 86 Also once the right has attached, it will gen-
erally continue uninterrupted until final conviction of the crime alleged
in the indictment or information.'8 7 The speedy trial right also applies
where one is held imprisoned in one jurisdiction with an indictment or
information lodged against him in another. 188
Article IV, section 2 of the United States Constitution is the source of
the power for one state to place a detainer upon a person imprisoned in
a sister state.' 89 Courts in the past generally refused to hold that the
speedy trial right applied to these prisoners. The courts reasoned that
any delay in bringing a defendant to trial as a result of prior incarcera-
tion did not constitute a violation of the defendant's right to a speedy
trial.190 However, the Supreme Court in Smith v. Hooey found that a
prisoner has a right to a speedy trial on all pending charges. 19' Gen-
184. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S.
307 (1971).
185. See Note, Speedy Trial, supra note 65, at 483-85.
186. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S.
307 (1971).
187. See, e.g., Finton v. Lane, 356 F.2d 850, 852 (7th Cir. 1966); Hanrahan
v. United States, 348 F.2d 363, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Therefore, if an accused is
granted a new trial, the right continues from the grant of the motion until the
beginning of the new trial. See, e.g., United States v. Gunther, 259 F.2d 173, 174
(D.C. Cir. 1958) (per curiam).
188. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
189. Over 30 percent of all federal prisoners have detainers pending against
them. Note, Effective Guaranty of a Speedy Trial for Convicts in Other lurisdic-
tions, 77 YALE L.J. 767 n.1 (1968). It was determined in 1969 that there were
about 23,700 detainers on file against 342,900 convicts in all prisons in the United
States, and that 70 percent of these are based upon the fact that the convict had an
untried charge pending against him. See Wenzel, Detainers: A National Survey
and the Right to Speedy Trial 2-8, April, 1969 (unpublished thesis, Northwestern
University School of Law), part of which is reported in Comment, The Convict's
Right to a Speedy Trial, 61 J. CiuM. L.C. & P.S. 352, 352-53 n.10 (1970).
190. Note, Detainers and the Correctional Process, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 417,
425 (1966). But see Note, Effective Guaranty of a Speedy Trial for Convicts in
Other Jurisdictions, 77 YALE L.J. 767 (1968). See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 26,
at §§ 3.1-3.2, for the ABA's proposals on the speedy trial guaranty for incarcer-
ated persons.
191. 393 U.S. 374 (1969). However, the Court left open the question of
when and how that right could be enforced. Because of the lack of jurisdiction of
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erally where courts are not willing or able to remove the detainers them-
selves, they may order prison officials to minimize their punitive effect.192
But where one complains his speedy trial right has been violated by the
delay in prosecution where a detainer is lodged he must still show that
he was prejudiced in some manner as the result of the state's delay. 193
RULE 48(b): FEDERAL PROTECTION AGAINST UNNECESSARY DELAY
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b) provides:
If there is unnecessary delay in presenting the charge to a grand jury or in filing
an information against a defendant who has been held to answer to the district
court, or if there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial, the court
may dismiss the indictment, information or complaint.
This rule is founded upon the sixth amendment right to speedy trial but
is not a statutory restatement of that right.194  The rule has two facets:
(1) it provides a means of enforcing the right of an accused to a speedy
trial under the sixth amendment; and (2) it codifies the inherent power of
the court to dismiss a case on the ground of unnecessary delay.195 The
power of the court to dismiss an indictment, information, or complaint
for unnecessary delay pursuant to Rule 48(b) is broader than its power
to dismiss for an unconstitutional denial of the speedy trial right, for this
rule permits dismissal even though there has been no constitutional vio-
federal courts over state prisoners against whom detainers are lodged the lower
federal courts have generally precluded prisoners from attacking the state indict-
ments on which the detainers are based while they are still serving terms in state
prisons for previous convictions (the remedy being to exhaust state court reme-
dies). See Goldfarb and Singe, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 175, 230 (1970). However, when state remedies are exhausted, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 permits the enforcement of the right to a speedy trial on state charges in
the federal district courts.
192. See Carnage v. Sanborn, 304 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Ga. 1969). Having a
detainer placed against an imprisoned person generally results in his confinement in
maximum security, the loss of prison privileges, the loss of desirable jobs, the loss
of the possibility of being sent to an honor farm, an inability to keep track of the
charges and to secure evidence in one's favor, the loss of eligibility for parole, and
the loss of the chance of having any new sentence being served concurrently with
his present one. See Schindler, Interjurisdictional Conflict and the Right to a
Speedy Trial, 35 U. CIN. L. REV. 179, 181-83 (1966); Note, Effective Guaranty of
a Speedy Trial for Convicts in Other Jurisdictions, 77 YALE L.J. 767, 771 (1968).
193. Carnage v. Sanborn, 304 F. Supp. 857, 858 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
194. Mathies v. United States, 374 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Cohen v. United
States, 366 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1035 (1967); Mann v.
United States, 304 F.2d 394, 397-98 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 896
(1962).
195. See, e.g., United States v. Mark H Electronics of Louisiana, Inc., 283 F.
Supp. 280, 283 (E.D. La. 1968).
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lation.19 6 However, this rule, like the constitutional guarantee applies
only to post-arrest situations. 197 In considering whether to dismiss pur-
suant to this rule a court will generally consider the same criteria as it
would if considering whether to dismiss pursuant to the speedy trial
clause.1
9 8
CONCLUSION
The speedy trial guarantee, although a fundamental right, is still given
little stature by itself in the federal courts. It is often confused with the
fifth amendment due process requirement and thus many conflicting and
almost totally confusing interpretations of this right have arisen prior to
and after the Supreme Court's decision in Barker. The courts require a
showing of actual prejudice to prove a violation of the speedy trial and
due process rights, while the other criminal procedural guarantees of the
Bill of Rights do not require such proof. 199 However, the showing of
actual prejudice should not be required where "lengthy"200 delay is in-
196. See, e.g., Mann v. United States, 304 F.2d 394, 397-98 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
A Rule 48(b) dismissal is without prejudice, United States v. Chase, 372 F.2d 453,
463-64 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 907 (1967), but dismissal under the
rule after the applicable statute of limitations has run would bar any further prose-
cution.
197. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 316-17 (1971). See also United
States v. Daley, 454 F.2d 505, 508 (1st Cir. 1972); Nickens v. United States, 323
F.2d 808, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1963); United States v. Hoffa, 205 F. Supp. 710, 720-21
(S.D. Fla. 1962).
198. See the text accompanying notes 43 and 44 supra. A Rule 48(b) dismissal
is also subject to the test of "sifted evidence and demonstrated facts," which ap-
pears to be nothing more than a description of the movant's burden of proof. Cf.
United States v. Sawyers, 186 F. Supp. 264, 265-66 (N.D. Cal. 1960); United
States v. Research Foundation, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 650, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
199. Note 117 and accompanying text supra.
200. The length of delay allowed should depend on the type of crime involved
and the source of the delay. Complex crimes which require more work by both
the defense and prosecution would thus be allowed more time than simple crimes
of violence such as robbery. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-31 (1972).
A delay caused by court docket congestion should not be allowed unless the prose-
cution can show that the defendant in some way caused the case to be caught in an
overloaded docket (i.e. he asked for a continuance which delayed the trial until a
time that is now congested; or, he requested a change of venue to a congested
docket).
See THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S
COMM. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 156-57 (1967)
for recommendations of management assistance for the courts. Courts should also
experiment with restoring control of a case to one judge who would handle it
throughout the pre-trial and trial phase of the criminal court process. Such an ex-
periment with an individual calendar initiated by the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York allowed case disposition to increase by 42
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volved, and if it must be proven the burden should be clearly on the prose-
cution to disprove prejudice.
The deleterious effects that the denial of this right has on the indi-
vidual should be sufficient to enforce the sixth amendment guarantee.
However, when one views the right of society to protect itself the speedy
trial guarantee may be seen as an answer to controlling the increasing
rise of crime in America today. Where a potential defendant is assured
of a speedy and expeditious resolution of any criminal charge against
him, it will enhance the deterrent intent of the criminal law. Moreover,
when society views such rapid but constitutionally proper prosecution it
may have more faith in the criminal process, thus reporting and appear-
ing in court to testify to criminal acts.
Kevin J. Caplis
percent. See Wilson, Delay and Congestion in the Criminal Courts, 46 FLA. B.J.
88, 90 (1972).
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